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Abstract

The welfare cost of anticipated inflation is quantified in a calibrated model of the U.S. economy that exhibits tractable equilibrium dispersion in wealth and earnings. Inflation does
not generate large losses in societal welfare, yet its impact varies noticeably across segments
of society depending also on the financial sophistication of the economy. If money is the
only asset, then inflation hurts mostly the wealthier and more productive agents, while those
poorer and less productive may even benefit from inflation. The converse holds in a more
sophisticated financial environment where agents can insure against consumption risk with
assets other than money.
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1

Introduction

A considerable amount of theoretical work, based on disparate modeling approaches,
supports the notion that eﬃciency in a monetary economy is inconsistent with inflationary policy. Yet, low predictable inflation is widely tolerated and sometimes advocated.
This discrepancy gives special relevance to a literature aimed at quantifying the social
cost of inflation and its distributional impact. A first strand of recent studies is based
on models where trade frictions provide explicit micro foundations for money. These
studies usually assume money is the only store of value and if they admit heterogeneity, then they must do some heavy lifting to compute analytically complex monetary
distributions. A second strand includes works based on models that often exhibit heterogeneity or a more sophisticated financial environment in which, however, money has
a more “descriptive” role.1 The present work ties together these strands of literature.
Tractable forms of ex-ante heterogeneity are introduced in a matching model of
money where money has an explicit medium of exchange function and there is no role
for private credit. The model is based on Lagos and Wright (2005), Boel and Camera
(2006) and Aliprantis, Camera and Puzzello (2007). Equilibrium exhibits a tractable
form of heterogeneity in wealth and earnings that allows an assessment, analytical and
quantitative, of the distributional impact of inflation. The model is calibrated to the
1

The first strand includes matching models as in Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2007), Chiu and
Molico (2007a,b), Lagos and Wright (2005), Molico (2006), or Reed and Waller (2006). The second
strand includes precautionary balances models, cash-in-advance with costly credit, or store-of-value
models as in Akyol (2004), Erosa and Ventura (2002), or Imrohoroglu (1992).
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U.S. economy and it is found that the welfare cost of inflation is small on average but
it is unequally distributed depending on heterogeneity and financial sophistication. In
the typical setting of a financially unsophisticated economy (money is the only asset)
inflation is a burden mostly or only for the wealthier and more productive segment of
society, and can even be advantageous for those poorer and less productive. However,
the distributional impact of inflation may change with greater financial sophistication,
i.e., when agents can insure against consumption risk by means other than money.
In the benchmark model agents can hold only money to insure against consumption
risk, as in the typical model of this class. In a calibrated representative-agent version
of this model, ten percent inflation is worth around one percent of consumption, which
is in line with previous studies; e.g., Cooley and Hansen (1989), Lucas (2000), Lagos and Wright (2005) to name a few. Subsequently, heterogeneity is introduced in
labor productivity or in trade shocks, considering two types of agents for analytical
tractability. The calibrated model still generates a low average welfare cost of inflation,
but inflation’s burden is now unequally distributed in society. Heterogeneity in trade
risk supports equilibrium dispersion in monetary wealth as those who are more likely
to trade save more than average; wealth inequality vanishes as nominal interest rates
approach zero. Heterogeneous productivity supports dispersion in earnings but not in
money holdings, because the structure of the model eliminates wealth eﬀects.
With heterogeneity, wealthier and more productive agents suﬀer the most from in-
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flation, while poorer and less productive agents suﬀer less and can in fact benefit from
it, i.e., they would require compensation to avoid inflation. The reason is that inflation
greatly penalizes average earnings of the more productive and, with equilibrium dispersion in money balances, it also creates unequal inflation-tax burdens that redistribute
monetary wealth top-to-bottom. On the one hand, these redistributive implications
are in line with quantitative and theoretical findings in models of the same class (e.g.,
Berentsen, Camera and Waller 2005, Chiu and Molico 2007a, Molico 2006). On the
other hand, they are at odds with the empirical observation that richer agents tend
to be less concerned about inflation than the poor (e.g., see Albanesi, 2007) and also
with the distributional results in Erosa and Ventura (2002).
To investigate these disparities, the economy’s financial sophistication is augmented
by introducing a nominal asset in addition to money. This asset is traded on a prototypical financial market, can provide consumption insurance, much as money, but
it can better shield agents from the inflation tax. The augmented model retains heterogeneous trade shocks and assumes finance generates no resource costs. It is shown
that at small to moderate inflation rates an outcome exists in which only agents who
trade and consume less than average choose to hold money, while the rest only hold
the asset. Inflation in this case has still a negative impact on societal welfare. However, the impact is quantitatively smaller than before and the redistributive eﬀects of
inflation are reversed. Now it is the poor who would give up consumption to avoid
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inflation, while the wealthy would demand more consumption. The reason is that only
poor agents are now subject to the inflation tax. The basic lesson from this simple
model is that the assumed financial structure not only can aﬀect the welfare cost that
inflation imposes on society as a whole, but it can also have a significant impact on
how the burden of inflation is distributed across society.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies
stationary monetary equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the calibration procedure and
reports the quantitative findings for an economy with only money, while Section 5
discusses the case of a financially more sophisticated economy. Section 6 concludes.

2

The model

Time is discrete, the horizon is infinite and there is a large population of heterogeneous
infinitely-lived agents who consume perishable goods and discount only even to odd
dates. So, consider trading cycles indexed by t = 1, 2, ... each with an odd and an
even date. As in Boel and Camera (2006) there are infinitely many spatially separated
trade groups each defining a market with infinitely many anonymous agents who have
not met before. Thus, in each trading cycle agents may visit two anonymous markets,
denoted ‘one’ and ‘two’ on odd and even dates.
On every date a single perishable consumption good can be supplied by producers,
i.e., agents who can transforms each unit of their labor into one good. Everyone can
produce and consume on even dates. Instead, at the start of each odd date agents
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draw i.i.d. trade shocks determining whether the agent can trade on market one, i.e.,
can either produce, consume, or do neither (idle). Consuming or producing are equally
likely. Hence, on odd dates agents face idiosyncratic trade (consumption) risk, but not
on even dates. Ex-ante heterogeneity is also introduced, in one of two forms; agents
can either diﬀer in their odd-date trade shocks, or productivity.2 For convenience the
population is divided into two types j = H, L in proportions ρ and 1 − ρ.
Even-date preferences are assumed homogeneous and quasilinear. An agent of type
j who consumes qj ≥ 0 goods and supplies xj ≥ 0 labor in market two (equivalently,
produces xj goods) has utility U (qj )−xj . On odd dates consumers of any type j derive
utility u(cj ) from cj ≥ 0 consumption. Producers of type j suﬀer φj (y) disutility from
producing y goods. The functions u, φj and U are twice continuously diﬀerentiable,
strictly increasing, with u < 0, φj > 0 and U < 0 < φ . Also, φj (0) = 0 and denote
with a star the quantities that uniquely solve u (c) = φj (c) and U (q) = 1. There is
heterogeneity in trade shocks when αj is the probability of trading on market one for a
type j, with 0 < αL < αH ≤ 1. There is heterogeneity in productivity if φH (y) < φL (y)
for each y > 0. Agents are price takers and trade under limited enforcement and limited
commitment, which given the frictions considered implies an essential role for money
(Aliprantis, Camera and Puzzello, 2007). A government exists that is the sole supplier
of fiat currency, of which there is an initial stock M̄ > 0 evolving deterministically at
2

See Bhattacharya, Haslag and Martin (2005) or Andolfatto (2009) for period-utility heterogeneity
in a similar model.
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gross rate π thanks to lump-sum transfers in market two.

3

Stationary monetary allocations
Consider the allocation selected by a planner who maximizes the agents’ lifetime

utilities, treating them identically, and constrained by the same physical and informational restrictions faced by agents. Such allocation, called the eﬃcient allocation, is
unique and stationary across trade cycles.3 The planner equates the marginal rates
of substitution of the diﬀerent types of agents, on each date. Hence, in what follows
the analysis focuses on stationary monetary outcomes. These are outcomes in which
consumption is invariant across trade cycles and the sequence of nominal prices evolves
so that the money stock has constant positive real value.
For simplicity omit t subscripts and use a prime to identify next-cycle variables.
Accordingly, p1 and p2 denote the nominal price of goods on odd/even dates (markets
one/two) of an arbitrary trade cycle t. Also, normalize nominal variables by p2 , so in
market one the real price is p =

p1
.
p2

The timing of events during cycle t for the arbitrary

agent of type j is as follows. He enters cycle t with real money holdings mj ≥ 0, saved
in the preceding cycle. After market one closes the agent enters market two on the
even date with mj,k real balances, where k = n, s, b denotes the idiosyncratic trade
shock experienced in market one (n if idle, b for buyer, s for producer).
3
This is the same allocation that would arise if agents could coordinate and commit to a nonmonetary trading plan on each odd date, before realizing their individual shocks.
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Individual (real) balances evolve within the cycle according to
(1)

mj,b = mj − pcj , mj,s = mj + pyj , and mj,n = mj .

In market one, a buyer spends pcj and a producer earns pyj . In market two, the real
price is one, qj is consumption, xj,k is production of an agent who received shock k,
and agents save mj ≥ 0 real balances to self-insure against future consumption shocks.
Short selling is not allowed and agents cannot lend to each other.
In a stationary monetary economy mj = mj > 0. So, if M is the nominal money
supply at the start of a cycle and M = πM is money available in market two, then
p2
p2

=

M
M

= π. The money growth rate (i.e., the inflation rate) is controlled via per-

capita lump-sum transfers τ in market two. If every type j holds the same amount of
money mj , then the government budget constraint is
τ = [ρmH + (1 − ρ)mL ](π − 1).
Given money market clearing, the stationary real money stock m̄ =
m̄ = ρmH + (1 − ρ)mL .

(2)
M
p2

is
(3)

Given the recursive nature of the problem, a dynamic programming approach is
used to describe the problem faced by an agent of type j on any date. Let Vj (mj ) be
the agent’s expected lifetime utility when he starts a trade cycle with mj > 0 balances
before trade shocks are realized. Let Wj (mj,k ) be the expected lifetime utility from
entering an even date with mj,k ≥ 0 balances.
7

The agent’s budget constraint at the start of an even date is
xj,k = qj + πmj − (mj,k + τ ),

(4)

where available resources partly depend on the realization of the shock k. Hence,
(5)

Wj (mj,k ) = max {U (qj ) − qj − πmj + mj,k + τ + βVj (mj )},
qj ,mj ≥0

so Wj (mj,k ) = Wj (0) + mj,k and the marginal valuation of money is type-independent,
∂Wj (ω j,k )
∂mj,k

= 1 for all j. The savings choice mj is independent of trading histories but

may be type-dependent. However, everyone consumes identically in market two since
(5) implies qj = q ∗ for all j, so
Wj (mj,k ) = U (q ∗ ) − q ∗ + mj,k + τ + max [−πmj + βVj (mj )].

(6)

mj ≥0

Goods market clearing implies
q ∗ = (1 − ρ)[

αL (xL,s +xL,b )
2

+ (1 − αL )xL,n ] + ρ[

αH (xH,s +xH,b )
2

+ (1 − αH )xH,n ].

In a monetary economy mj > 0, hence the first order condition is 1 =

β
π

×

(7)

∂Vj (mj )
.
∂mj

Savings mj depend on the expected marginal benefit of holding money in market one,
∂Vj (mj )
,
∂mj

which may diﬀer across types j, as shown next.

For a type j holding mj balances at the start of market one
Vj (mj ) = max

αj
[u(cj )
2

+ Wj (mj,b ) − φj (yj ) + Wj (mj,s )] + (1 − αj )Wj (mj,n )

where the maximization is over cj ≤

mj
p

(8)

as a buyer and yj ≥ 0 as a producer. If yj > 0

for all j, then optimality in market one requires
p = φj (yj ) and u (cj ) ≥ p for j = H, L,
8

(9)

so production and consumption are generally type-dependent.4 If the consumer’s constraint is not binding, then u (cj ) = p, solved uniquely by c(p) > 0, so any unconstrained type spends m∗ = pc(p). If the constraint is binding, then u (cj ) > p so a type
j consumes cj < c(p) and spends mj < m∗ . Thus,
cj = min{

mj
, c(p)}.
p

(10)

The planner’s allocation satisfies u (cj ) = φj (yj ), which is sustained only if cj = c(p),
since p = φj (yj ), i.e., when monetary constraints bind for no-one.
To find optimal savings of type j use (1) and (5) in (8) to obtain
Vj (mj ) = mj +

αj
[u(cj )
2

− φj (yj )] +

αj
p(yj
2

− cj ) + Wj (0)

where cj satisfies (10). If mj < m∗ (constrained buyer), then
∂Vj (mj )
∂mj

=1+

αj
2

k

u (cj )
p

∂cj
∂mj

=

l
−1 .

1
p

(11)

and so
(12)

The expected lifetime utility Vj (mj ) depends on the agent’s wealth mj and two other
elements: a type-dependent continuation payoﬀ Wj (0) and an expected surplus from
market one trades. With identical probability

αj
2

either the agent spends pcj money

enjoying utility u(cj ), or earns pyj money suﬀering disutility φj (yj ). The change in
wealth expected from market one trades, p(yj − cj ), is zero in a representative agent
model since y = c. Instead, with unequal balances or productivity, produced and
consumed amounts may be mismatched. Goods market clearing on odd dates implies

4

αH ρyH + αL (1 − ρ)yL = αH ρcH + αL (1 − ρ)cL .

(13)

Since φ > 0 then yj > 0 for all j. With φ = 0 only the most eﬃcient type would produce.

9

Definition: Given an initial money stock M̄ > 0 and a government policy (π, τ ), a
competitive stationary monetary equilibrium is a time-invariant list of real quantities
(cj , yj , q, xjk , mj ) and prices (p1,t , p2,t ) consistent with the government budget constraint
(2), market clearing (3), (7) and (13), and optimality (9) and (10).
In equilibrium, from 1 =

π
β

β
π

×

∂Vj (mj )
∂mj

=1+

αj
2

k

and (12) one gets the Euler equation

u (cj )
p

l
− 1 for j = H, L.

(14)

The right hand side displays the nominal yield on money, one, plus its expected liquidity premium. It is non-negative because money is needed to trade in market one
and u (cj ) ≥ p from (9). The liquidity premium grows with the severity of liquidity
constraints and the probability of consumption shocks. The left hand side is the (gross)
nominal interest rate on an illiquid bond (not traded here, but see Boel and Camera
2006), so let i =

π
β

− 1 be the net nominal interest rate. Since p = φj (yj ), then (14) is
i=

αj
2

k

u (cj )
φj (yj )

l
− 1 for j = H, L.

(15)

Hence, there are two equations in two unknowns (cH , cL ), which can be uniquely determined as a function of the model’s parameters and i, which summarizes the policy
parameter in the present model. Hence, monetary policy aﬀects consumption in market
one.
Consider two classes of economies, with heterogeneity in trade shocks and in productivity. The former exhibits αL < αH and φj (y) = φ(y) for all j, hence p = φ (y)
10

and output yj is type-independent. The latter exhibits φL (y) > φH (y) and αj = α for
all j, hence p = φj (yj ) and yj is type-dependent.
Lemma: Any stationary equilibrium must be such that π ≥ β, i.e., i ≥ 0. A unique
stationary monetary equilibrium exists for π > β and it is such that: (i) with trade
shocks heterogeneity mL < mH < m∗ , so cL < cH < c(p); (ii) with productivity
heterogeneity mj = m < m∗ and cj = c < c(p) for all j; (iii) if π → β (the Friedman
rule), then mj → m∗ and cj → c(p) for all j.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose a monetary equilibrium exists with π < β.
From (14) one needs π ≥ β + β(αj /2)[u (cj )/φj (yj ) − 1] ≥ β. This contradicts π < β.
So, let π > β. From (14), as π → β then u (cj ) → p = φj (yj ), implying cj → c(p) for
j = H, L. Hence mH → m∗ and mL → m∗ . Now consider trade shocks heterogeneity.
By concavity of u, if π > β, then u (cj ) > p = φ (y) for all j and so cL < cH < c(p) and
mL < mH < m∗ . Consider productivity heterogeneity. Here cH = cL = c since αj = α
for all j in (14). Hence, mH = mL = m < m∗ . If π > β, then c < c(p), so m < m∗ .
Existence follows from inspection of optimality and market clearing conditions.
The rate of return on money

1
π

cannot exceed the shadow interest rate

1
β

in steady

state equilibrium. If that were the case, then agents would want to keep accumulating
money, which is not a stationary monetary equilibrium. Second, the allocation is
eﬃcient as i → 0 because u (cj ) = p = φj (yj ) for all j. Individual money holdings
in this case converge to the average value m∗ because the liquidity premium vanishes,
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hence neither productivity nor trade-frequency diﬀerences aﬀect saving decisions.
The equilibrium distribution of money depends on the heterogeneity considered.
There is no equilibrium dispersion in money balances when agents diﬀer only in productivity because trade shocks and preferences over goods are homogeneous, so agents
self-insure and consume identically. However, p = φj (yj ) so yL < yH , hence xHs < xLs
(from (4)). This means that low-productive agents work more than average in market two to make up for low market one sales. Instead, money balances are unequally
distributed when trade shocks are heterogeneous because those more likely to trade
self-insure more, holding more money than average. In this case inflation redistributes
monetary wealth, as shown next.
Fixing π, let cjπ , yjπ , mjπ and m̄π denote equilibrium quantities, where (3) and
(10) imply m̄π = p[ρcHπ + (1 − ρ)cLπ ] with p = φj (yjπ ); use (6) and (11) to define
equilibrium ex-ante welfare for type j by Vjπ , where
(1 − β)Vjπ =

αj
[u(cjπ )
2

− φj (yjπ )] + U (q ∗ ) − q ∗

α
+ 2j φj (yjπ )(yjπ

(16)

− cjπ ) + (π − 1)(m̄π − mjπ ).

Inflation π aﬀects ex-ante welfare in three ways. It distorts market one consumption
and output, hence it aﬀects the expected trade surplus

αj
[u(cjπ )
2

− φ(yπ )]. This is the

only distortion in a representative-agent setting, since the second line in (16) vanishes
because mjπ = m̄ and cjπ = cπ = yjπ = yπ for all j. With heterogeneity, generally
inflation aﬀects Vjπ in two additional ways. It impacts expected net earnings in market
one,

αj
φ (y )(yjπ
2 j jπ

− cjπ ), which can be nonzero because agents may produce and
12

consume diﬀerent amounts. If money balances are heterogeneous, then inflation also
redistributes monetary wealth thanks to inequalities in the inflation tax (π − 1)(m̄π −
mjπ ). Clearly, there is no redistribution if π = 1 (no inflation). If π = β, then the
second line in (16) vanishes since mj → m∗ = m̄ and cjβ → cβ = yβ for all j. Instead,
in the model with heterogeneous trade shocks inflation redistributes monetary wealth
from the top to the bottom of the distribution, because mLπ < m̄π < mHπ for all
π > β. This mirrors the findings from the related matching models of Berentsen,
Camera and Waller (2005), Chiu and Molico (2007a), and Molico (2006).

4

Quantitative analysis in the basic model
The welfare cost of inflation for a type j is a standard compensating variation

measure. It is the percentage adjustment in consumption (both markets) that leaves
the agent indiﬀerent between some inflation π > β and a lower rate z ≥ β. Given
¯ z (income, expenditure, and hours
that consumption is adjusted by the proportion ∆
worked are unaltered), use (16) to define adjusted ex-ante welfare V̄jz by
(1 − β)V̄jz =

αj
¯ jz cjz )
[u(∆
2

¯ jz q ∗ ) − q ∗
− φj (yjz )] + U (∆

α
+ 2j φj (yjz )(yjz

(17)

− cjz ) + (z − 1)(m̄z − mjz ).

¯ jz that
For a type j, the welfare cost of π instead of z inflation is the value ∆jz = 1 − ∆
satisfies Vjπ = V̄jz . If ∆jz > 0, then type j is indiﬀerent between π, or z inflation with
consumption reduced by ∆jz percent.
To calibrate common parameters and to compute benchmark measures for the
13

welfare cost of inflation a representative-agent version of the model is considered. Then,
heterogeneity is re-introduced. The focus is on a yearly model of the U.S. for the sample
period 1929-2006. The nominal interest rate i is the annualized yield on short-term
commercial paper, the nominal price level P is GDP deflator, aggregate nominal output
P Y is nominal GDP, and the nominal money supply M is M1.5

4.1

Representative-agent economy

Set αj = α and φj (y) = φ(y) for all j, so p = φ (y), pc = m and c = y. Fix
u(c) =

c1−a −1
,
1−a

U (q) = A ln(q) so q ∗ = A, and let φ(y) =
c=



α
2i+α

1
 δ+a−1

.

yδ
.
δ

From (15) one gets
(18)

Set β = 0.96, a = 1 (i.e., u(c) = log c), and δ = 1.1.6 The remaining parameters
to calibrate are α and A. The procedure in Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007) is
used to calibrate α. First, the interest elasticity of M1 is estimated using a standard
approach, obtaining −0.33756.7 The theoretical interest elasticity of money demand
5

For 1929-75, the yield on commercial paper is from Friedman and Schwartz (1982, Table 4.8, col.
6). For 1976-96, it is from Economic Report of the President (1996, Table B-69). For 1997-06, it is the
Financial Commercial Paper with 3-month maturity in H.15 Selected Interest Rates, Federal Reserve
Statistical release. M 1 is in billions of dollars, December of each year, not seasonally adjusted. For
1929-58, it is from Friedman (1963, p. 708-718, col. 7). For 1959-06, it is from the St. Louis Fed
FRED Database. For 1929-06, nominal GDP is from The National Income and Product Accounts of
the United States. Running the analysis for a quarterly specification yields similar results (see Table
1); this matches the findings in Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007). Additional sensitivity analyses
and details on analytical derivations are in the working paper Boel and Camera (2009) and in the
online appendix in Science Direct.
6
This facilitates comparisons to studies based on Lagos and Wright (2005), which usually assume
unit elastic preferences and linear disutility in both markets. Setting δ = 1 has virtually no impact on
our calibration and aggregate welfare cost results, but does not allow us to consider equilibria where
diﬀerentially eﬃcient producers are active.
7
Following Goldfeld and Sichel (1990), the log of real money balances on each date t (Mt /Pt )

14

is εm =

2iφ (y)
αcu (c)

2i
= − (2i+α)a
. The average interest in the sample period is i = 0.044.

Now, given a = 1, one finds that the value α = 0.145 matches the theoretical to the
empirical elasticity.
The parameter A is chosen to fit the ratio L =

M
PY

, which can be interpreted as

money demand because real balances M/P are proportional to real output Y with a
factor of proportionality L(i) that depends on the nominal interest rate. For the empirical counterpart of L the above-described data is used. To construct the theoretical
expression for L note that aggregate nominal output is P Y = p1 α2 c + p2 A, i.e., nominal output in markets one and two. From (3), the equilibrium nominal money stock
M = p2 m, so normalizing by p2 one gets L =

m

α
pc+A
2

. Hence, L = L(i) ≡

1
,
α/2+Ac−δ

with c defined in (18). Given the parameters fixed above, the value A = 2.537 minimizes the distance between L in the data and in the model.8 Figure 1 shows how the
calibrated money demand (solid line) fits the data in the sample period (circles). The
R2 coeﬃcient is 0.550. As a comparison, the dashed L(i) is for a model where α is
is regressed on the date t log of real GDP, nominal interest rates, and one-period lagged balances:
ln mt = γ 0 + γ 1 ln yt + γ 2 ln it + γ 3 ln mt−1 + vt . To account for first-order autocorrelation in the
residuals vt the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure is used.
8
The parameter α = 0.145 may seem “small,” since some studies set α = 1 to minimize the search
frictions (Lagos and Wright, 2005, Chiu and Molico 2007a) or calibrate α to higher values (Aruoba,
Waller, and Wright, 2007, Chiu and Molico 2007b). However, the fit of the model worsens for α > 0.145
(α = 1 gives the poorest fit). In addition, though α has no obvious empirical counterpart, it aﬀects
the share of market one output, α2 L(i). In our model this share is bounded above by 13% (set α = 1
and calibrate A = 2.537); in the calibrated model it is about 2%. Similar shares emerge from other
studies; in Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007) the share is less than 10% (around 4% in the calibrated
model), in Chiu and Molico (2007a) it is below 9%, and it is below 10% in Lagos and Wright (2005)
at 4% inflation. This suggests the calibrated parameter α is not too small.
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selected to deliver the best possible fit.9
Figure 1 and Table 1 approximately here
Table 1 reports the welfare cost of 10% anticipated inflation as opposed to no
inflation and the Friedman rule. These costs are around or below 1% of consumption,
in line with the findings from studies based on various representative-agent models.10
The next sections study how heterogeneity aﬀects this initial finding.

4.2

Heterogeneous trade shocks

Suppose agents diﬀer only in trade shocks. As seen earlier, equilibrium money
holdings are heterogeneous, mLπ < m̄π < mHπ and the parameters (ρ, αL , αH ) pin
down the shares of money held by diﬀerent segments of society. Given the parameters
fixed above, let α = 0.145 correspond to average trade shocks, i.e., ραH + (1 − ρ)αL =
0.145, and calibrate (ρ, αL , αH ) using U.S. data on the distribution of liquidity holdings.
The Survey of Consumer Finances of the Federal Reserve Board reports a measure
called “liquidity,” which includes the total value of all types of transactions accounts
held by surveyed U.S. households. Dividing households into income quintiles, the share
9

The parameter A is calibrated for α values going from 0.025 to 1. The coeﬃcient R2 rises quickly
with α, attains a maximum R2 = .61 for α ≈ .075, and then drops slowly to .15. The implied share of
market one output rises in α. Intuitively, the best fit requires a suﬃciently small share of monetary
trade. Chiu and Molico (2007b) obtain a remarkable fit by including endogenous costly participation
in market two; unfortunately, this reduces analytically tractability, so this case is not considered in
this study.
10
For example, the welfare cost of 10% inflation (as opposed to no inflation) is around 1.3% in Lagos
and Wright (2005) and 0.7% in Aruoba, Waller and Wright (2007), for similar pricing mechanisms;
it is around 1% in Lucas (2000) and just a fraction of 1% in Cooley and Hansen (1989). See also the
discussion and references in Lucas (2000) and Lagos and Wright (2005).
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of liquidity held in 1995 by the top two quintiles of U.S. households was 94.1%, while
the bottom 60% held the remaining liquidity (shares are not dramatically diﬀerent in
earlier years). In the model m̄ is the theoretical measure of total liquidity, so

ρmH
m̄

is the share of liquidity held by types H. Associating j = H to the top two income
quintiles gives ρ = 0.4. The values (αL , αH ) = (0.003, 0.357) match the theoretical
liquidity share to its empirical counterpart.
The average (or aggregate) welfare cost of inflation in this heterogeneous-agent
version of the model remains positive, though it is smaller than for the representative
agent (Table 1). The reason is that the burden of inflation is now unevenly distributed.
Those who consume less hold less money than average and suﬀer less because the inflation tax redistributes to them some of the monetary wealth of the richer agents. To
check the sensitivity of the results consider mean-preserving spreads for (αL , αH ) arbitrarily fixing ρ = 0.5 and varying αL from 0 to 0.145. Figure 2 reports the welfare costs
(average and type-specific) against αL ; moving left to right equilibrium consumption
and wealth disparities fall, converging to the representative-agent model.
Figure 2 approximately here
To sum up the results, in this heterogeneous-agent model anticipated inflation
lowers aggregate welfare, but the burden of inflation falls mostly (or solely) on the
shoulders of the high-consumption, ‘rich’ segment of society. The aggregate welfare
loss is smaller than in the representative-agent model and is aﬀected by monetary
17

wealth inequality. Wealth disparities result in unequal inflation tax burdens, which
induce a top-to-bottom redistribution of monetary wealth. This redistribution reduces
the welfare loss of the poor and, in fact, can even increase their welfare, which is why
in Figure 2 the average welfare cost falls with greater heterogeneity. However, inflation
is never beneficial to society as a whole, i.e., the positive redistributive eﬀect does not
dominate the consumption distortions so i = 0 is always the best policy.
The welfare cost of inflation for a given segment of society increases with the share
of monetary wealth held by that segment. In Figure 2 the welfare cost for agent j
rises with αj because mj rises. Redistributive eﬀects are stronger the greater is the
disparity in monetary wealth, which is why inflation benefits no-one when there is little
dispersion in money holdings (far right in Figure 2).
The above findings share similarities and diﬀerences with results from related models that exhibit nondegenerate equilibrium monetary distributions, e.g., Chiu and
Molico (2007a,b), Molico (2006), and Reed and Waller (2006), as well as dissimilar
models, e.g., Akyol (2004), Erosa and Ventura (2002), and Imrohoroglu (1992). On
the one hand, one can draw a parallel between the quantitatively small societal welfare
loss from anticipated inflation in the present work and other works. The welfare cost
of 10% inflation is close to zero in Akyol (2004), around 0.6% in Chiu and Molico
(2007a,b), 1.57% in Erosa and Ventura (2002), about 1% in Imrohoroglu (1992), and
around 1% (relative to the Friedman rule) in Reed and Waller (2006).
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On the other hand, diﬀerences emerge from comparing other results, especially
those regarding implications for optimal monetary policy and the redistributive impact
of inflation. First, the present study suggests that inflation’s redistributive impact mitigates the overall welfare loss but is not a suﬃcient reason to run any policy other than
zero nominal interest rates, i.e., moving away from the Friedman rule cannot generate
societal welfare gains. This is unlike in Molico (2006), where some inflation can raise
welfare, or the precautionary balances model in Akyol (2004) where small welfare gains
are also possible.11 Second, the top-to-bottom direction of monetary wealth redistribution is unlike in Erosa and Ventura (2002) where, given increasing returns to scale in
the cost to liquidate high-return assets, inflation can act as a regressive tax.

4.3

Heterogeneous productivity

Now suppose agents have identical needs for consumption insurance but diﬀerent
labor productivity. Fix the preference parameters to the calibrated representativeagent values and give diﬀerently eﬃcient production technologies to diﬀerent agent
types. A type L must supply θ − 1 more hours than a type H to produce the same
amount of output y, i.e., φj (y) =

(θj y)δ
δ

with θL = θ > θH = 1. Interpret θj yj as hours

worked to produce yj output, i.e., type L agents must work longer than type H to
produce the same amount of output. Hence φL (y) > φH (y) for all y > 0. With this
formulation one can define (c, yL , yH ) as explicit functions of the parameters and since
11

In Molico (2006) agents can self-insure only at random, which is why low inflation can improve
average welfare. Instead, in our model and Chiu and Molico (2007a,b) self-insurance opportunities
arise deterministically. In Akyol (2004) inflation redistributes income top-to-bottom.
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choosing output or hours worked is equivalent, we yj is used instead of hours.
The relative productivity parameter θ is calibrated to match the ratio of productivity in the service sector (very productive) to the goods sector (less productive).
Productivity is measured by average output per hour in nonfarm private industries
using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1987-2006. Hence, θ = 4.24. Then,
fix ρ = 0.77 to match the proportion of employment in the service sector.
The welfare cost of inflation in this heterogeneous economy is unequally distributed,
with the (more) productive agents suﬀering the most (Table 1). The average welfare
cost is very close to that for the representative agent since there is neither equilibrium
dispersion in money holdings (inflation cannot redistribute wealth) nor in consumption
(consumption distortions are identical across agents). Welfare cost disparities stem
from inequality in market one average net earnings (that sum up to zero). Productive
agents earn more than they spend on average, yHπ > cj > yLπ , and their income falls
with inflation. So, the social burden of inflation lies mostly on their shoulders.
Unlike the previous heterogeneous-agents version, no segment of this unequally
productive society benefits from inflation (Table 1). The reason is that by fixing
δ = 1.1, the model implies a large wage elasticity of labor supply in market one (it
is

1
).
δ−1

To determine how the wage elasticity impacts the results, Figure 3 reports

the welfare cost of inflation for δ ∈ [1.01, 5], i.e., wage elasticities falling from 100 to
0.25. As the elasticity falls, the welfare cost falls and, for a suﬃciently low elasticity,
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it turns negative for the less productive. This is equivalent to income redistribution.
Hence, even in this model with no equilibrium monetary wealth inequality, inflation
can benefit low-consumption agents at the expense of high-consumption agents.
Figure 3 approximately here

5

Money is not the only asset
Money is typically the only financial asset available in the class of models to which

this study belongs.12 However, the impact of inflation on social welfare should depend on whether alternative assets exist that can provide consumption insurance and
oﬀer some inflation protection. So, the model is extended to let agents hold more
“sophisticated” financial portfolios.
To induce equilibrium heterogeneity in financial portfolios set αL < αH and fix
φj = φ for all j. To augment financial sophistication, introduce a prototypical competitive financial sector that oﬀers risk-pooling services. In market two agents can
buy consumption insurance from an intermediary selling one-period nominal assets at
price θ > 0. Assets can only be redeemed in the following market one for claims to
money, which are enforceable in market two and are financed with the revenue from
asset sales. The intermediary earns zero profits and operates at zero resource cost.
In this version of the model money and assets oﬀer some consumption insurance,
and trade frictions aﬀect financial markets, also. Market one buyers can redeem the
12

But see Bencivenga and Camera (2008), Lagos and Rocheteau (2008), or Telyukova and Wright
(2007).
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asset and spend its claims to consume. Sellers can redeem the asset to cash its claims
in the next market. However, idle agents cannot participate in market one, i.e., can
access neither goods nor financial markets and so cannot redeem the asset. This form
of limited participation in financial and goods markets aﬀects agent types diﬀerently.
The asset is less attractive to those who are less likely to be present on market one.
For a type j holding bj ≥ 0 assets and mj ≥ 0 money one must add bj and πθbj to
the right hand sides in, respectively, (1) and (4). Hence,
Vj (mj , bj ) = mj + αj bj +
where pcj ≤ mj +bj , so cj = min{
where

∂cj
∂bj

=

1
p

αj
[u(cj )
2

− φ(y)] +

mj +bj
, c(p)}.
p

αj
p(y
2

Clearly

(19)

− cj ) + Wj (0, 0),

∂Vj (mj ,bj )
∂bj

= αj +

αj
[u
2

∂c

(cj )−p] ∂bjj

for a constrained buyer. As usual, the agent’s need for consumption

insurance depends on αj . Equation (14) is still needed for mj > 0, while bj ≥ 0 if
θ πβ ≥ αj +

αj
2

k

u (cj )
p

l
−1 .

(20)

As done earlier, consider stationary outcomes where all market one buyers are constrained. Note that wealthier U.S. households have less liquid and more sophisticated
financial portfolios than those at the bottom of the wealth distribution (Erosa and Ventura 2002). So, conjecture an outcome in which those who consume less than average
hold more money but less assets than average. The simplest scenario is bH > bL = 0
and mL > mH = 0. It is optimal if for j = L, then (14) holds and (20) is a strict inequality; the converse must hold for j = H. This is an equilibrium for some suﬃciently
small inflation rate bounded away from β.
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To demonstrate it observe that if only types H buy πb assets at price θ, then the
repayment constraint faced by the intermediary is
(21)

πθb = αH b,

which gives the price θ consistent with zero profits. Since αH is the redemption probability for j = H, the asset’s expected return is

αH
θ

and it equals the inflation rate. In

this sense, the asset can insure types H against inflation.
From (20)-(21), one sees that bH > 0 requires
αH ( β1 − 1) =

αH
2

k

u (cH )
p

l
−1 .

(22)

Notice that αH ( β1 − 1) < βπ − 1 for all π > π̄ = β + αH (1 − β) ∈ (β, 1). If (22) holds,
l
k
then πβ − 1 > α2H u (cpH ) − 1 for all π > π̄ (so mH = 0). As π → β then u (cH ) = p

(eﬃciency) and type H holds only money. Intuitively, if π ≤ π̄, then inflation is small
and assets oﬀer consumption insurance that is too expensive relative to the insurance
oﬀered by money. Otherwise, type H agents prefer holding assets but not money, since
by doing so they can consume more.
Now consider a type L. Optimality implies bL = 0 and mL > 0 when π < π̃ =

β + αH − βαL ; note that π̃ > π̄ and π̃ > 1 if β >

1−αH 13
.
1−αL

Intuitively, when π < π̃ assets

oﬀer consumption insurance that is too expensive for agents who trade less frequently
than average. These agents place less value on the asset and buy it only if inflation is
l
k 3
From (14), optimality requires πβ − 1 = α2L u (cp L ) − 1 for mL > 0. For bL = 0 expression (20)
must hold as a strict inequality. This occurs if θ πβ > αL + πβ − 1. Use (21) to get π < π̃.
13
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suﬃciently high, i.e., if money is a suﬃciently poor store of value.
To sum up, if π ∈ (π̄, π̃), then only types L hold money, so those who have the most
money are not the ones who consume and trade the most. Hence, (cL , cH ) = ( mpL , pb )
m̄
, 0), and (bL , bH ) = (0, b). Now
satisfy (14) and (22), (mL , mH ) = ( 1−ρ

Wj (mj,k ) = U (qj ) − qj − πθbj − πmj + mj,k + τ + βVj (bj , mj ),

(23)

which diﬀers from (5) due to asset holdings.
Using (19) and (23), equilibrium ex-ante welfare for a type j is
(1 − β)Vj (bj , mj ) =

αj
[u(cj )
2
α
+ 2j p(y

− φ(y)] + U (q ∗ ) − q ∗

(24)

− cj ) + (π − 1)(m̄ − mj ) + bj (αj − πθ).

Here, bj = pcj − mj and p = φ (y). The term bj (αj − πθ) captures the impact of
ρ
m̄
inflation on asset holdings. Given mH = bL = 0, the net inflation tax is −(π − 1) 1−ρ

for type L and (π − 1)m̄ for H. So, inflation generates a wealth transfer from L to H
types. Assets holdings are not subject to the inflation tax because the expected return
on assets is π, i.e., the asset price perfectly adjusts for inflation.14
Given the calibrated parameters one gets (π̄, π̃) = (0.975, 1.315). Hence, a comparison is made between equilibria with 0% and 10% inflation in which only type L agents
hold money. Inflation still generates a positive average welfare cost. However, the
impact is quantitatively smaller and the redistributive eﬀects of inflation are reversed,
compared to the money-only version of the model (Table 1). Now it is the poor who
would pay to avoid inflation, while the wealthy would demand more consumption.
14

Since mL = pcL the last two terms in (24) are (π − 1)ρpcL and (π − 1)(1 − ρ)pcL for j = L, H.
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Inflation lowers societal welfare less than before because not everybody holds money
in this version of the model. The redistributive impact of inflation is reversed because
those who trade less frequently not only save and consume less than average, but are
also the only ones who save with money. Hence the burden of inflation falls entirely
on the shoulders of the poorest segment of society.
The basic lesson is that the economy’s financial structure not only aﬀects the size
of the welfare loss imposed by inflation on society, but it can also have significant
consequences for how this loss is distributed across society. Whether inflation is more
a concern for the rich or for the poor depends on whether agents are diﬀerentially able
to participate in goods and financial markets. In the model, those who have greater
need for consumption insurance can also more easily participate in financial markets.

6

Final remarks
This study has considered a monetary economy where ex-ante heterogeneous agents

hold money to insure against consumption risk. Stationary equilibrium exhibits tractable
forms of dispersion in monetary wealth and earning profiles. By calibrating the model
to the U.S. economy, it has been shown that the societal welfare loss from moderate
anticipated inflation is not large. Yet, the impact of inflation can vary noticeably
across society. If money is unequally distributed in equilibrium and it is the only
asset, then inflation can benefit low-consumption agents by redistributing monetary
wealth top-to-bottom. The direction of redistribution can change if additional assets
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exist that provide consumption insurance, because wealthier agents might prefer to
hold less money than poorer agents. The lesson is that the burden of inflation can
be unequally distributed across society, not only depending on frictions in trade but
also on the financial structure of the economy. Camera, Chiu, and Molico (2009) takes
this analysis a step further with a model capable of generating richer distributions of
wealth and money.
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Figure 1: US money demand with fitted model.
Notes: Each circle identifies M/PY against i, for each year in the sample period 1929-2006. The
solid line depicts the calibrated money demand L(i). The dashed line depicts a calibrated money
demand for a model where α is selected to deliver the best possible fit.
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Average

Representative agent
Het. trade shocks
Het. trade shocks + asset
Het. productivity

0.868
(0.668)
0.300
(0.222)
0.044
(0.037)
0.868
(0.669)

No Inflation
Top 40% Bottom 60%

--

--

1.932
(1.547)
-0.023
(-0.021)
0.891
(0.690)

-0.787
(-0.662)
0.089
(0.077)
0.790
(0.600)

Average

1.077
(0.828)
0.429
(0.327)
0.134
(0.079)
1.078
(0.830)

Friedman Rule
Top 40% Bottom 60%

--

--

2.042
(1.629)
-0.006
(-0.021)
1.128
(0.873)

-0.646
(-0.541)
0.227
(0.146)
0.911
(0.684)

Table 1: Percentage welfare cost of 10 percent inflation relative to No Inflation and the
Friedman rule.
Notes: Results for a quarterly specification of the model are in parentheses. Quarterly data
are for the period 1947- 2006. M1 is seasonally adjusted and for each quarter we consider
M1 from the third month of the quarter. For the period 1947-1958, M1 is from Friedman’s
A Monetary History of the United States, 1857-1960. For the period 1959-2006 it is from
the FRED database at the St. Louis Fed. Output is annualized GDP from the U.S. BEA
(quarterly data), so we divide each data point by 4. The price is GDP deflator from the U.S.
BEA. The interest rate is the annualized yield of the 3 month T-bill from FRED (monthly
data). To get a quarterly interest rate, we average the monthly data for each quarter and
divide this average value by 4. The discount rate is now 0.01 so β= 0.99, and 10% annual
inflation rate implies π-1=2.41% in the quarterly specification.
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Figure 2: Percentage welfare costs of 10 percent inflation, relative to no inflation, against αL
Notes: The figure is drawn for the model with heterogeneity in trade risk, so that αL< αH. The
average value of the parameters αj is given the calibrated value α=0.145 in the representative model
given ρ=0.5.
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Figure 3: Percentage welfare costs of 10 percent inflation, relative to no inflation, against δ.
Notes: The figure is drawn for the model with heterogeneity in market one productivity. The
relative productivity parameter is θ=4.24 and the proportion of H types is ρ=0.77. The wage
elasticity falls as δ increases. As δ varies α and A are not recalibrated because εm is independent of δ
and L(i) is also independent of δ because a=1. The welfare cost curve for the representative agent
model overlaps with the average welfare cost curve reported in the figure.
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